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Abstract 
 
One effort to secure vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication is to use 
a symmetrical cryptographic scheme that requires the distribution of 
shared secret keys. To reduce attacks on key distribution, physical 
layer-based key formation schemes that utilize the characteristics of 
wireless channels have been implemented. However, existing schemes 
still produce a low bit formation rate (BFR) even though they can 
reach a low bit error rate (BER). Note that V2V communication 
requires a scheme with high BFR in order to fulfill its main goal of 
improving road safety. In this research, we propose a higher rate 
secret key formation (HRKF) scheme using received signal strength 
(RSS) as a source of random information. The focus of this research is 
to produce keys with high BFR without compromising BER. To reduce 
bit mismatch, we propose a polynomial regression method that can 
increase channel reciprocity. We also propose a fixed threshold 
quantization (FTQ) method to maintain the number of bits so that the 
BFR increases. The test results show that the HRKF scheme can 
increase BFR from 40% up to 100% compared to existing research 
schemes. To ensure the key cannot be guessed by the attacker, the 
HRKF scheme succeeds in producing a key that meets the randomness 
of the NIST test. 
  
Keywords: V2V security, RSS, polynomial regeression 
  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade, along with the development of communication and 
transportation technology, vehicles have been equipped with high-tech 
devices to communicate with each other. Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) 
communication utilizes an ad-hoc wireless network that allows vehicles to 
send various information on the road to other vehicles, such as traffic jams, 
warning of obstacles, or lane changes. Thus, V2V communication can improve 
driving safety and traffic flow efficiency to reduce the number of vehicle 
accidents [1]. Moreover, the vehicle can also send position and speed 
information at that time with a special purpose. An on-board unit (OBU), which 
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functions as a transmitter must be installed in each vehicle to send and receive 
messages from other vehicles. However, the development of communication 
on V2V increases the risk of vehicle attacks caused by data exchange via the 
internet and wireless networks [2]. One possible type of attack is 
eavesdropping, where the attacker listens secretly for information exchanged 
between authorized parties [3]. Furthermore, this information is used by 
unauthorized parties for personal gain that harms other vehicle users. 
Therefore, security issues in V2V technology are a big challenge for 
researchers. Various aspects of security that must be considered in V2V 
communication are ensuring the authenticity of information, maintaining the 
confidentiality of information, and knowing that information comes from the 
claimed source [3-5]. If these aspects cannot be met, the attacker can easily 
damage the main purpose of V2V technology. 
To ensure the confidentiality of V2V communication, authorized parties 
must encrypt and decrypt messages, which are called cryptographic 
techniques [6]. Messages can be secured using asymmetric or symmetrical 
cryptographic schemes. Due to the need for complex mathematical operations 
and high computational time, asymmetric cryptographic schemes are not 
suitable for devices that have limited resources, such as on vehicular networks 
[7-9]. In contrast, symmetrical cryptographic schemes can be relied upon 
because of low computational time [9]. In this scheme, all authorized parties 
must obtain a distributed key before encrypting and decrypting messages. 
This makes symmetric cryptographic schemes vulnerable to key leaks, so 
communication between authorized parties has a high potential to be 
attacked. Recently, physical layer (PHY) characteristics are used as an 
alternative solution to establish secret keys on wireless networks [10-13]. 
PHY-based key formation scheme can overcome the problems of symmetric 
cryptographic schemes in terms of key distribution. It utilizes the properties 
of physical layer such as randomness and reciprocity of wireless channels to 
measure random information as a source of secret key formation. Randomness 
provides unexpected key characteristics, making it difficult for unauthorized 
parties to guess the key formed [13]. The principle of channel reciprocity is 
very important in key formation, where the random information obtained by 
the sender and receiver will be the same if they extract it within the coherent 
time [14]. There are several parameters that can be used as random 
information, such as received signal strength (RSS) [15-18], channel status 
information (CSI) [12, 19], and channel impulse response (CIR) [19]. The RSS-
based key formation scheme can be easily implemented compared to the other 
two parameters because most existing wireless devices already provide RSS 
reading [20]. Therefore, RSS is widely used as information to generate PHY-
based secret keys. 
There are many researches about RSS-based secret key formation that 
are implemented in different scenarios. The method in this research produced 
a low bit error rate (BER) but still produced a low bit formation rate (BFR) [18, 
21-23]. Bit error rate refers to the number of bit inequalities between the 
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sender and receiver of the entire key length. The bit formation speed is the 
total number of bits at the end of the key formation scheme for each RSS 
sample. They sacrifice a lot of bits that must be discarded to produce keys 
without errors. The secret key formation scheme that cannot reach high BFR 
is not suitable for V2V communication because there will be a delay in key 
formation. Two vehicles were out of range before successfully establish a 
shared secret key, causing a fatal error in road traffic. What's more, high 
mobility is the main feature of V2V where vehicles can move randomly so the 
challenge of establishment a key in V2V is to produce high BFR and zero BER 
using uncomplicated algorithms. 
In this research, we propose a higher rate secret key formation (HRKF) 
scheme based received signal strength for V2V communication with a focus on 
increasing BFR without sacrificing BER. To provide confidentiality of data 
exchanged between vehicles, we use symmetric cryptography, AES-256, due 
to its low computational time [24]. The HRKF scheme consists of 4 main stages: 
channel characteristics measurement; reciprocal enhancement; quantization 
and encoding; and randomness extraction and key verification. We use the 
second order polynomial regression in the reciprocal enhancement stage to 
significantly increase the correlation between vehicles. This stage aims to 
reduce the BER of the key formed. A fixed threshold quantization (FTQ) 
method is designed to map RSS into four different levels. Then the quantized 
RSS is encoded into two-bits. This allows our scheme to establish secret keys 
with high BFR even in high mobility scenarios. In the second stage, we also 
adopt the level crossing algorithm as a first step to prevent successive 0 or 1 
bits. Furthermore, this algorithm is able to eliminate all bit mismatches 
between authorized parties. Therefore, this scheme can produce zero BER 
without the bit error correction stage as in the existing schemes. Note that the 
bit error correction stage, commonly known as the information reconciliation 
stage requires the exchange of bit parity between authorized parties. Besides 
requiring a good network connection, the parity bit exchange stage is also 
vulnerable to eavesdropping. We evaluate the capabilities of the HRKF scheme 
by comparing it to the existing schemes in three metrics, namely BER, BFR, and 
randomness of the keys. The results of our research show that the proposed 
HRKF scheme outperforms the bit formation rate without any bit errors. All 
keys pass the NIST test to guarantee its randomness. Although it can produce 
high bit rates, this scheme does not require high computational time because 
it is designed for V2V communication. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews 
previous related research. Section III explains the originality of this research. 
Section IV explains in detail the proposed HRKF scheme and measurement 
scenarios. Section V analyzes the proposed scheme in three metrics and 
compares with other existing schemes. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper. 
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2. RELATED WORKS 
There are several studies of key formation in wireless networks, mainly 
based on received signal strength. The purpose of their research is to get the 
best possible secret key that can be used for a secure communication process. 
Aono et al. [25] proposed a quantization method that uses a threshold 
derived from the median of RSS measurements. This scheme produces a high 
BER. To overcome this problem, Mathur et al. [26] proposed a lossy-
quantization method used in RSS-based secret key generation schemes. The 
proposed quantization method uses two thresholds and will discard the RSS 
value that is between the upper and lower threshold. In addition, this scheme 
proposes a level crossing algorithm that only retains one bit (0 or 1) of m-bits. 
If m-bits consist of different bits, they will be discarded. This scheme produces 
a low BER and high entropy so that it does not need the randomness extraction 
stage (known as the privacy amplification stage) anymore. But it produces a 
low BFR. 
Jana et al. [27] utilize the mean and standard deviation of each RSS block 
as a quantization threshold. The proposed adaptive scheme uses two 
thresholds (q + and q-) and will convert RSS to 1 and 0 if it is above q + and 
below q- respectively. Otherwise, RSS measurements are discarded. This 
scheme can produce high BFR and entropy, but there is still a bit error even 
though it has passed the information reconciliation stage. The determination 
of the quantization threshold in [27] was developed by Ambekar et al. [6] to 
divide each RSS block into 4 levels. Each level is quantized into two bits based 
on gray code and no bits are discarded (lossless quantization). This scheme 
utilizes the average and variance of each RSS block as a threshold. The BFR of 
this scheme increases than the scheme [27], but the problem cannot reach 0-
bit error. 
The method of pre-processing before the quantization stage is equally 
important in key formation scheme. The author [28] proposed three pre-
processing methods to improve reciprocal channels, namely minimization of 
norm l1, polynomial regression, and Kalman filter. As a result, the pre-
processing stage can increase BFR and decrease BER. Mike et al. [21] proposed 
a secret key generation scheme by combining a modified Kalman filter and 
several quantization methods. This scheme divides the RSS measurement into 
several blocks to be processed using the Kalman filter. The test results show 
that the use of modified pre-processing can produce the same key bits without 
going through the information reconciliation stage. The combination of 
Kalman filter and adaptive quantization produces higher BFR and lower BER 
than other quantizations. However, the attacker also has a high BFR so it is 
possible to get the same key. 
 
3. ORIGINALITY 
We propose a higher rate secret key formation (HRKF) scheme to 
establish a secret key as security for V2V communication. The wireless channel 
information used is received signal strength (RSS) collected from a mobile 
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scenario at a frequency of 5.8 GHz. The HRKF scheme uses a combination of 
polynomial regression and fixed threshold quantization (FTQ) method to 
produce a secret key with a higher BFR than the existing scheme. The FTQ 
method is a modification of lossless quantization, where RSS data is divided 
into several blocks before being quantized and encoded into 2 binary bits. The 
combination of these two methods can establish a secret key formation 
scheme without an error correction stage. The secret key obtained has a high 
BFR and zero BER. Thus, this scheme can be applied to V2V communication 
given that V2V requires a non-complex scheme to obtain keys without delay. 
The proposed scheme will be compared with several studies, such as research 
[22] that use hybrid methods at the pre-processing stage, research [21] that 
use the Kalman filter and adaptive quantization, research [23] that use the 
Kalman filter and Modified Multibit (MMB) quantization, and research [18] 
that use the Kalman filter and Mathur quantization. 
 
4. SYSTEM DESIGN 
In this section, we briefly introduce the HRKF scheme model which 
consists of the attacker model, the system model, the key formation process of 
HRKF scheme, the message encryption-decryption process using AES-256 
algorithm, and performance metrics. 
 
4.1 Attacker Model 
In this research, we have considered the 3-node model as shown in 
Figure 1. Alice and Bob acted as authorized vehicles while Eve acted as an 
unauthorized vehicle. Eve is a passive attacker in this scenario. He eavesdrops 
on all the information exchanged between Alice and Bob. It is assumed that 
Eve knows all the methods in the HRKF scheme used by Alice and Bob to 
establish a shared secret key. 
 
 
Figure 1. Attacker Model 
 
With constant velocity, Alice and Bob carry out a measurement process 
to explore the characteristics of wireless channels in the form of RSS, ℎ௕and ℎ௔  
as a source of key formation. On the other hand, Eve followed the direction of 
the authorized vehicles to get RSS measurements from Alice, ℎ௘௔ and Bob, ℎ௘௕ 
by eavesdropping. The goal is to get an identical key, so Eve can leak the 
confidentiality of the message between Alice and Bob. The attacker, Eve also 
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assumed to be more than half the wavelength (𝑑 > 𝜆/2) from the position of 
Alice and Bob. If the attacker is far from authorized parties, the RSS obtained 
cannot be used to generate an identical secret key because it is not correlated 
(ℎ௔ ≠ ℎ௘௔ and ℎ௕ ≠ ℎ௘௕) [14]. Meanwhile, RSS obtained by Alice and Bob will 
be highly correlated (ℎ௔ ≈ ℎ௕) if they carry out the measurements within the 
coherence time [28]. 
 
4.2 System Model 
The HRKF scheme aims to establish shared secret keys by utilizing the 
characteristics of wireless channels. Reciprocity is a characteristic of wireless 
channels that is the principle of forming a secret key based on RSS. In this 
scheme, Alice and Bob cannot send and receive signals at the same time. 
Therefore, the channel characteristics obtained between authorized parties 
are not identical. In this condition, the principle of reciprocity must be fulfilled, 
so that Alice and Bob can make an identical secret key. To meet the principle 
of reciprocity, measurements are carried out within the coherence time (𝑇௖). 
Coherence time is defined as the maximum time duration that the wireless 
channel response is stable. The Doppler effect can affect the coherence time 
because there are vehicles movement in V2V communication, where 𝑇௖  is 
inversely proportional to the Doppler frequency (𝑓஽). The vehicle velocity (𝑣) 
of the authorized parties and carrier frequency (𝑓௖) determines the value of 𝑓஽  
as given in Equations 1 and 2. 
 
𝑓஽ =
௩
ఒ
                           (1) 
𝜆 = ଷ௫ଵ଴
ఴ ௠/௦
௙೎
                    (2) 
 
Conversely, randomness can be fulfilled if the time interval of 
measurement exceeds the coherence time. The high randomness of channel 
characteristics makes it difficult for an attacker to get an identical key to 
authorized parties. 
 
4.3 HRKF Scheme 
The proposed HRKF scheme consists of four stages, including channel 
characteristics measurement, reciprocal enhancement, quantization and 
encoding, and randomness extraction and key verification. The sequence of the 
key formation stages is shown in Figure 2. The first stage is used to collect 
characteristics of wireless channels between authorized parties. In this 
scheme, channel characteristics are obtained from the signal sent by using the 
ping command. Alice sends a ping to Bob at time 𝑡, then Bob measures and 
stores the RSS received from Alice, expressed as ℎ௕ . At time 𝑡ᇱ, Bob responds 
to Alice, then Alice measures and stores the RSS received from Bob, expressed 
as ℎ௔ . To ensure channel reciprocity, the value of (𝑡 − 𝑡ᇱ) must be less than the 
coherence time. Thus, Bob must respond as quickly as possible after receiving 
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a signal from Alice. Note that we cannot be sure Bob can respond quickly in 
coherence time. However, we can adjust the measurement time interval (𝑇௠) 
that is smaller than the coherence time. Thus, the characteristics of wireless 
channels are highly correlated. The process of measuring wireless channel 
characteristics is carried out alternately. At the end of the channel 
characteristics measurement stage, Alice and Bob get several 𝑚 RSS expressed 
in Equations 3 and 4.  
 
 
Figure 2. HRKF Scheme 
 
ℎ௔ = [ℎ௔(1), ℎ௔(2), ℎ௔(3), … , ℎ௔(𝑚)]்                       (3) 
ℎ௕ = [ℎ௕(1), ℎ௕(2), ℎ௕(3), … , ℎ௕(𝑚)]்                 (4) 
 
Eve, who was on the same network as Alice and Bob, eavesdropped on 
the characteristics of the channels exchanged by the authorized parties. He can 
receive ℎ௘௔ from Alice and ℎ௘௕ from Bob without sending a ping command. If 
Alice and Bob get 𝑚 RSS, then Eve also gets RSS in the same amount as shown 
in Equations 5 and 6. Because it is assumed that the distance of Eve is more 
than 1/2 wavelength, the channel information obtained does not correlate 
with authorized parties. 
 
ℎ௘௔ = [ℎ௘௔(1), ℎ௘௔(2), ℎ௘௔(3), … , ℎ௘௔(𝑚)]்                      (5) 
ℎ௘௕ = [ℎ௘௕(1), ℎ௘௕(2), ℎ௘௕(3), … , ℎ௘௕(𝑚)]்                (6) 
 
An illustration of the mechanism for measuring channel characteristics 
between Alice and Bob is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. RSS Measurement between Alice and Bob 
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The second stage is reciprocal enhancement which aims to increase RSS 
correlation between Alice and Bob. We use the second order polyomial 
regression method. Second order polynomial Regression is known as 
quadratic for each block of RSS data as shown in Equation 7. 
 
ℎ௝ = 𝑎଴ + 𝑎ଵ𝑥௝ + 𝑎ଶ𝑥௝ଶ                                 (7) 
 
where ℎ௝ is the RSS data at time 𝑥௝ with 𝑗 = (1, 2, 3, … , 𝑚). The polynomial 
regression Equation can be shown in Equation 8. We use the elimination 
method to get 3 unknown polynomial coefficients (𝑎଴, 𝑎ଵ, 𝑎ଶ). 
 
 
∑ℎ௝ = (𝑎଴. 𝑚 + 𝑎ଵ. ∑𝑥௝ + 𝑎ଶ. ∑𝑥௝ଶ)   
∑𝑥௝ℎ௝ = (𝑎଴. 𝑥௝ + 𝑎ଵ. ∑𝑥௝ଶ + 𝑎ଶ. ∑𝑥௝ଷ)     
∑𝑥௝ଶℎ௝ = (𝑎଴. 𝑥௝ଶ + 𝑎ଵ. ∑𝑥௝ଷ + 𝑎ଶ. ∑𝑥௝ସ)    
(8) 
 
The third stage is quantization and encoding using the fixed threshold 
quantization (FTQ) method. In this stage, RSS data is divided into 8 blocks 
where each block will be divided into 4 groups based on 3 certain thresholds. 
The threshold utilizes the mean and standard deviation of each RSS block, 
shown as Equation 9. The FTQ method is a modification of the MMB 
quantization method, but the threshold used is permanent in order to obtain a 
high BFR. 
 
𝑄௨ = ൞
−∞,   𝜇 − 10 ∗ 𝜎    ; 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 1
𝜇 − 10 ∗ 𝜎,   𝜇        ; 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 2
 𝜇,   𝜇 + 10 ∗ 𝜎       ; 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 3
 𝜇 + 10 ∗ 𝜎, ∞        ; 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 4
    (9) 
 
Furthermore, RSS data in each group is encoded into 2 binary bits, group 
1 = 10, group 2 = 01, group 3 = 11, and group 4 = 00. The quantization result 
using MMB quantization is 𝐾௨ as shown in Equation 10, where 𝑚 is the number 
of RSS channel characteristics. There are no wasted channel characteristics so 
the size of 𝐾௨ is 2 × 𝑚. 
 
𝐾௨ = [𝑄௨(1), 𝑄௨(2), … , 𝑄௨(𝑚)]்                           (10) 
 
Then, 𝐾௨ sequences are divided into several blocks, each consisting of 3 
binary bits to be processed using a level crossing algorithm. The purpose of 
this algorithm is to increase the randomness of the key bits generated from the 
quantization output. One block will be converted to single bit 0 or 1 if all three 
bits in the block are the same. Otherwise, the block will be discarded. In this 
condition, there is a block index exchange between two authorized parties. If 
Alice removes the 𝑥-block, Alice sends the index of block to Bob. Bob will also 
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delete his 𝑥-block. This also applies if Bob deletes the 𝑦-block and sends the 
block index to Alice. Alice will also delete her 𝑦-block. Thus, the level crossing 
algorithm can also reduce the value of BER. 
The next stage is randomness extraction and verification. Key 
randomness is very important for cryptographic schemes so that the attacker 
cannot guess the key used to encrypt and decrypt messages easily. The key 
obtained as an output from the quantization stage does not fully meet the 
randomness requirements even though it has been processed using the Level 
Crossing algorithm. We use Universal Hash to increase the randomness of the 
key in order to meet the minimum entropy requirement, which is 0.01. The 
randomness level was tested using the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) statistical tests. The output from Universal Hash is a 
number of 256-bit keys that have different entropy. Then a key that has the 
highest entropy is chosen as the secret key agreed by Alice and Bob. In this 
case, the key is called the best key. 
The best key from Alice is not necessarily the same as Bob because the 
key that has the highest entropy in Alice is not necessarily the same as the key 
in Bob. Therefore, we use SHA-256 as verification to guarantee that the keys 
agreed between two authorized parties are the same. The verification process 
uses the digest of the best key to be exchanged so that the attacker does not 
know the actual best key. The best key between Alice and Bob is identical if the 
digest received is the same. 
 
4.4 Encription and Decription Process 
To secure secret messages on V2V communication you can use 
symmetric cryptography. We use a combination of AES-256 with SHA-256. An 
illustration of the message encryption and decryption process between Alice 
and Bob is shown in Figure 4. Alice uses the best key obtained to encrypt the 
original message into ciphertext. Furthermore, the ciphertext is processed 
using the SHA-256 function to provide higher security. The ciphertext is sent 
together with Alice's digest to Bob. To convince Bob that the sender is Alice, 
Bob must process the ciphertext that was received using SHA-256. If Bob's 
digest results are the same as Alice's digest, Bob decrypts the ciphertext using 
thes best key to produce the original message. 
  
 
Figure 4. The process of Securing Messages using AES-256 
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4.5 Performance Metrics 
There are five performance metrics to determine the performance of the 
HRKF scheme. The measurement position of each performance metric in the 
HRKF scheme is shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Position of Performance Metrics in the HRKF scheme 
 
Performance metrics in this reseacrh include correlation coefficient of RSS 
measurement and RSS with high reciprocity, BMR, BER, BFR, and randomness. 
A detailed explanation of the five performance metrics are as follows: 
 
1. Correlation coefficient 
The correlation coefficient of RSS between Alice and Bob were tested to 
determine the effect of using the second order polynomial regression method 
at the pre-processing stage. An increase in the correlation coefficient of an 
authorized parties indicates the success of the method used in terms of 
increasing channel reciprocity. In order to have the possibility to get an 
identical key, the correlation coefficient must be getting closer to 1. 
2. Bit Mismatch Rate (BMR) 
BMR is a comparison of the number of mismatch bits between Alice and 
Bob with the total bits after the quantization and encoding stage using the FTQ 
method. This metric will affect the next stage in the HRKF scheme. If the BMR 
value is very high, many bits are discarded so that the number of bits produced 
is smaller. 
3. Bit Error Rate (BER) 
BER is a comparison of bit mismatches between Alice and Bob with the 
total bits produced after the level crossing process. This metric shows the 
success of the proposed FTQ method. The HRKF scheme does not use the error 
correction stage. Therefore, the BER must be equal to 0 before going through 
the randomness extraction and key verification stage. 
4. Bit Formation Rate (BFR) 
BFR is the total number of bits generated in each RSS sample after the 
level crossing process. The more random bits that are obtained, the more bits 
are wasted. This causes lower BFR. The more consecutive 1 or 0 bits, the higher 
the BFR. The higher BFR indicates that the method used is suitable for V2V 
communication scenarios. 
5. Randomness 
The randomness of the key was measured using the NIST test. In this 
case, we use 7 parameters on the NIST-test to test this metric. If each 
parameter value is more than 0.01, the secret key meets the randomness 
requirements. 
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5. EXPERIMENT AND ANALYSIS 
This section describes two mechanisms including a description of the 
experiment and analysis of the HRKF scheme. We describe the devices and 
scenarios in the experiment implementation section. Meanwhile, the analysis 
section explains the performance evaluation of the HRKF scheme and 
comparison with other existing schemes. 
 
5.1 Implementation of Experiment 
To evaluate the HRKF scheme that we have proposed, we implemented 
using three Raspberry Pi 3 Model B devices with the specifications in Table 1. 
The wireless connectivity used is WiFi because of this research was 
implemented in V2V communication. Two Raspberry Pi became Alice and Bob 
as authorized parties, and the other Raspberry Pi became Eve as an 
eavesdropper. Each device is equipped with an 802.11ac wireless USB adapter 
with a frequency of 5.8 GHz to measure wireless channel characteristics. We 
conducted an HRKF scheme in an outdoor environment to support the V2V 
communication scenario. 
 
Table 1. The Spesification of Raspberry Pi 3 Model B 
Spesification Raspberry Pi 3 Model B 
Processor Broadcom BCM2837 chipset 
CPU 1.2 GHz Quad-Core ARM Cortex-A53 (64-bit) 
Memory 1 GB LPDDR2 
Operation System Linux, Raspian, Windows 10 
Storage Micro SD port 
Wireless Connectivity 802.11n wireless LAN (WiFi), Bluetooth 4.1, Bluetooth 
Low Energy (BLE) 
Power Micro USB 5V, 2.5 A 
 
 
Figure 6. Measurement Scenario 
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In this research, we conducted several experiments on Suramadu Street, 
Surabaya. In Figure 6, Alice and Bob are placed 3 meters away and moving at 
the same constant velocity. The farther the distance between Alice and Bob 
will decrease the correlation coefficient of the measurement results so that the 
bit mismatch will increase. With a distance of 3 meters provides the most 
optimal measurement of the correlation coefficient. While Eve is behind Bob 
as far as 3 meters to eavesdrop on RSS from Alice and Bob. The velocity of Eve's 
vehicle follows the velocity of the authorized parties. Both authorized and 
unauthorized parties collected 2000 RSS data as a key formation source. There 
are 6 experiments with varying velocities and time intervals. Vehicle velocities 
are 40 km/hour, 50 km/hour, and 60 km/hour. The length of the track needed 
to get 2000 RSS data at each velocity are about 0.2 km, 0.15 km and 0.1 km, 
respectively. Due to the length of the track is not too long, we used a constant 
velocity. Based on the calculation of the Doppler effect, the coherence time for 
each speed is 4.7 ms, 3.7 ms, and 3.1 ms, respectively. In this experiment we 
measured with 2-time intervals, the first is less than coherence time and the 
second is more than coherence time for each velocity. The time intervals that 
are within the coherence time will fulfill the principle of channel reciprocity. 
While time intervals that are outside the coherence of time will fulfill the key 
randomness. Table 2 shows the various experiments conducted in this 
research. 
 
Table 2. Research Experiment 
Experiment Vehicle’s Velocity Interval Time of Measurement 
Additional 
Information 
1 40 km/hour 3.5 ms Less than 𝑇௖  2 10 ms More than 𝑇௖  
3 50 km/hour 2.5 ms Less than 𝑇௖  4 7 ms More than 𝑇௖  
5 60 km/hour 2 ms Less than 𝑇௖  6 5 ms More than 𝑇௖  
 
5.2 Experimental Result 
This section explains the performance metrics results of the proposed 
scheme as well as comparisons with other existing schemes. 
 
5.2.1 Correlation Coefficient 
RSS measurement data between Alice and Bob have an initial correlation 
coefficient below 0.5 as shown in Table 3. Experiments with interval time less 
than coherence time have a higher correlation coefficient than experiments 
with interval time more than coherence time. This is because the measurement 
of RSS within the time interval allows RSS obtained by Alice and Bob to be 
similar, so it has a high correlation. Based on Table 3, experiment 1 has the 
highest correlation coefficient and experiment 6 has the lowest correlation 
coefficient. The lower the vehicle velocity, the higher the correlation 
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coefficient of RSS measurements, so Alice and Bob have the highest RSS 
correlation coefficient at velocity of 40 km/hour. Meanwhile, the correlation 
coefficient between Eve and the legitimate parties is close to 0 and there is also 
a negative correlation. The smaller the correlation coefficient, the more 
difficult it is to produce an identical secret key because the channel 
characteristics obtained are increasingly different.  
The correlation coefficient between Alice and Bob has not been fulfilled 
for processing in the second stage. Therefore, we process RSS measurement 
data using polynomial regression to increase the correlation coefficient. The 
results of increasing the correlation coefficient are shown in Table 3. After the 
pre-process stage, Alice and Bob's correlation coefficient increased 
significantly to reach a correlation coefficient of 0.9, except in experiment 6.  
Experiment 2 has the highest correlation coefficient after the pre-processing 
stage, which is 0.99. The polynomial regression method is also used by Eve to 
increase the correlation coefficient obtained from authorized users. Based on 
Table 3, Eve can also increase the correlation coefficient in each experiment. 
But the correlation coefficient increases only on one side, so Eve is still difficult 
to obtain a key that is identical to the authorized parties. 
 
Table 3. Measurement and Increased Correlation Coefficient 
Experiment Vehicle 
Measurement 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Increased 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
1 
Alice and Bob 
Alice and Eve 
Bob and Eve 
0.4891 
-0.1081 
0.2345 
0.9206 
-0.6260 
0.7890 
2 
Alice and Bob 
Alice and Eve 
Bob and Eve 
0.4297 
0.2845 
0.1566 
0.9976 
0.4387 
0.7955 
3 
Alice and Bob 
Alice and Eve 
Bob and Eve 
0.3396 
0.0436 
-0.3030 
0.8856 
0.4568 
0.0324 
4 
Alice and Bob 
Alice and Eve 
Bob and Eve 
0.2363 
-0.1912 
-0.3143 
0.9620 
-0.6246 
-0.8841 
5 
Alice and Bob 
Alice and Eve 
Bob and Eve 
0.2640 
-0.1030 
-0.4097 
0.9851 
0.0020 
-0.5160 
6 
Alice and Bob 
Alice and Eve 
Bob and Eve 
0.1797 
-0.5030 
0.0880 
0.3465 
-0.6711 
0.1185 
 
From all the results obtained it can be concluded that the polynomial 
regression method at the pre-process stage can increase the correlation 
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coefficient of Alice and Bob significantly more than 100%. Increasing the 
correlation coefficient has a large impact on the possibility of producing 
identical secret keys. Thus, the pre-process stage of the HRKF scheme can 
increase the channel reciprocity between Alice and Bob. 
 
5.2.2 Bit Missmatch Rate (BMR) 
The second stage is quantization and encoding, where the pre-processed 
RSS data is converted to binary bits. In this research, RSS data are divided into 
8 blocks. We use the FTQ method on each RSS data block to divide into 4 
groups. Each group is bounded by an upper and lower threshold based on 
averages and standard deviations. Furthermore, each RSS value is converted 
to 2-bits so that the total number of bits after the quantization and encoding 
process is 4000-bits for the whole experiment. The bits produced by Alice are 
not necessarily the same as the bits produced by Bob, although the correlation 
coefficient has been increased. This is because the RSS grouping on Alice's side 
is not the same as Bob's, so the encoding results will also be different. Table 4 
shows the BMR values of all experiments in this research. 
 
Table 4. Performance of HRKF Scheme in Terms of BMR  
Experiment Vehicle BMR (%) 
1 
Alice and Bob 
Alice and Eve 
Bob and Eve 
12.60 
43.00 
55.60 
2 
Alice and Bob 
Alice and Eve 
Bob and Eve 
19.20 
40.80 
60.00 
3 
Alice and Bob 
Alice and Eve 
Bob and Eve 
15.10 
31.70 
40.00 
4 
Alice and Bob 
Alice and Eve 
Bob and Eve 
8.40 
55.20 
60.00 
5 
Alice and Bob 
Alice and Eve 
Bob and Eve 
5.10 
41.90 
41.10 
6 
Alice and Bob 
Alice and Eve 
Bob and Eve 
35.95 
39.30 
36.55 
 
Based on Table 4, BMR between Alice and Bob in all experiments did not 
exceed 20%, except in experiment 6 which had the smallest correlation 
coefficient even after the pre-processing stage. Experiments that have the 
highest correlation coefficient do not guarantee to have the lowest bit 
mismatch. In Table 3, Alice and Bob have the highest correlation coefficient in 
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experiment 2, which is 0.99%. However, the lowest BMR between Alice and 
Bob was in experiment 5, which was 5.10%. On the other hand, BMR between 
Eve and authorized parties is between 30% to 60%. From these results it can 
be concluded that the attacker has a higher number of bit mismatches than the 
legitimate user, so Eve is difficult to make an identical key. 
 
5.2.3 Bit Error Rate (BER) dan Bit Formation Rate (BFR) 
The bits sequence produced by Alice and Bob still contains many 
consecutive 0 and 1 bits. Therefore, we use a level crossing algorithm to 
improve bit randomness. All bits are divided into several blocks, each block 
consisting of 3 bits. Blocks will be discarded if they contain 0 and 1 bits. 
Otherwise, each block will be converted to a single 1 or 0 bit. This algorithm 
can also reduce the number of bit mismatches after the quantization and 
encoding stages. The BER value between Alice and Bob is equal to 0% in all 
experiments. This is because there is an unused block index exchange between 
authorized parties. Therefore, the HRKF scheme does not require the bit error 
correction stage. On the other hand, Eve knows the block index exchanged 
between Alice and Bob so Eve also discards the block at that index. However, 
Eve does not send index blocks to authorized users so that the number of Eve 
bits after the crossing level process is not the same as the bits from authorized 
parties. Therefore, BER from Eve cannot be analyzed. Discarding blocks in the 
level crossing process causes the total number of final bits in the whole 
experiment is not the same. The fewer bits discarded, the more bits produced 
so that the BFR will also increase. Table 5 shows the BFR values for all 
experiments. 
The highest BFR between Alice and Bob is in experiment 5, which is 80.00 
bps and the lowest BFR is in experiment 6, which is 20.40 bps. These results 
are related to the BMR value, where experiment 5 has the lowest BMR value 
and experiment 6 has the highest BMR. But for other experiments the BMR 
value does not determine the value of the BFR. A low number of bit mismatches 
does not necessarily result in a high BFR, and vice versa. This result is caused 
by the level crossing algorithm that works based on blocks to increase bit 
randomness. Measurement time intervals also affect the BFR between Alice 
and Bob. Experiments carried out in coherence time have a higher BFR than 
trials with time intervals exceeding coherence time. This is caused by 
randomness in the experiment with the time interval below the coherence 
time is smaller than above the coherence time so that many bits are discarded 
during the process of level crossing. 
Meanwhile, Eve has a smaller BFR than the authorized parties in all 
experiments. In fact, there are several experiments where BFR Eve is 0 bps 
which means there are no bits left. These results indicate that the total number 
of bits produced by Eve after the level crossing is very low due to block 
removal in this process. From the BFR results obtained, Eve could not produce 
an identical secret key because the required key size was 256-bits to encrypt 
and decrypt messages using AES-256. Thus, the HRKF scheme is secure from 
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passive attacks such as eavesdropping because the attacker is unsuccessful in 
establishing the same key despite knowing all the methods used by authorized 
parties. 
 
Table 5. Performance of HRKF Scheme in terms of BFR  
Experiment Vehicle BFR (bps) 
1 
Alice and Bob 
Alice and Eve 
Bob and Eve 
51.26 
0.00 
0.00 
2 
Alice and Bob 
Alice and Eve 
Bob and Eve 
21.50 
0.00 
0.00 
3 
Alice and Bob 
Alice and Eve 
Bob and Eve 
58.10 
2.84 
1.51 
4 
Alice and Bob 
Alice and Eve 
Bob and Eve 
45.05 
2.15 
3.90 
5 
Alice and Bob 
Alice and Eve 
Bob and Eve 
80.00 
0.00 
0.00 
6 
Alice and Bob 
Alice and Eve 
Bob and Eve 
20.40 
0.00 
4.15 
 
5.2.4 Randomness 
The last stage in the HRKF scheme is to increase the randomness of the 
bits resulting from the level crossing process with zero BER. We use the 
universal hash function to create several random 256-bit key candidates. Of 
the several key candidates obtained, one key was chosen with the highest 
approximate entropy to be the best key. The best key is then used by Alice and 
Bob as a shared secret key to carry out the cryptographic process while 
communicating on the road. Key randomness is very important because it 
minimizes the attacker to find out the pattern of the secret key. To ensure key 
randomness, we use 7 types of tests available on the NIST test. Explanation of 
the 7 parameters in Table 6 is as follows. The first test is the Approximate 
Entropy to determine the frequency of possible overlaps of all bit patterns in 
key sequences. The second test is Frequency to show the proportion of bits 0 
and bit 1 in the key sequence. The third test is Block Frequency to determine 
the ratio of 1 for each block is half a block. The fourth and fifth tests are 
Forward and Reverse to compare the cumulative number of keys generated 
with the expected random cumulative number. Forward changes bit 0 to -1, 
and Reverse changes bit 1 to +1. The sixth test is Run to determine the 
oscillations of bits 0 or 1 in the key sequence too fast or slow. The final test is 
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the Longest Run to find out whether the length of 1 tested is consistent with 
the expected length of 1 from a random sequence. 
 
Table 6. NIST Test Result 
Type of Test 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Approximate Entropy 0.636 0.714 0.747 0.810 0.622 0.622 
Frequency 0.900 0.617 0.708 0.317 0.617 0.617 
Block Frequency 0.582 0.582 0.893 0.344 0.582 0.582 
Forward 0.746 0.906 0.746 0.338 0.804 0.804 
Reverse 0.630 0.630 0.946 0.573 0.974 0.974 
Run 0.212 0.814 0.208 0.754 0.790 0.790 
Longest Run 0.230 0.648 0.200 0.478 0.357 0.357 
 
The test results of all experiments are shown in Table 6. The best key in 
each experiment fulfills the randomness requirement with parameter values 
of more than 0.01 in all types of tests. These results indicate that the key 
established from the HRKF scheme can be used to secure V2V communication. 
Based on Table 6, experiments with interval times exceeding coherence time 
with the same speed have higher or at least equal approximate entropy than 
experiments with interval times less than coherence time. 
 
5.2.4 Comparison with Other Schemes in Existing Research 
In this research, we tested the value of BFR by comparing the 
performance of the HRKF scheme with several other key formation schemes, 
including scheme[22], scheme [21], scheme [23], and scheme [18]. The 
difference between the HRKF scheme and some comparison schemes is the 
method used for the pre-processing and quantization stages. For the pre-
processing stage, scheme [22] uses the hybrid polynomial regression and 
Kalman filter while scheme [21], [23], and [18] use the Kalman filter with 
different parameters. For the quantization stage, scheme [22] and [23] use the 
MMB quantization method, scheme [21] uses the adaptive quantization 
method, and scheme [23] uses the  Mathur quantization. Figure 7 shows the 
results of the BFR comparison of several schemes. 
Overall, the HRKF scheme had the highest BFR in all trials compared to 
the existing scheme. The HRKF scheme can significantly increase BFR from 
40% to more than 100%. The highest increase in BFR occurs when the HRKF 
scheme is compared with the study [18]. This is because the scheme [18] uses 
a single-bit quantization method that converts one RSS value into one bit and 
discards several bits that are between the threshold. This quantization method 
is commonly called lossy quantization which will affect the number of bits 
produced. Meanwhile, other comparison schemes use the lossless 
quantization method, no bits are discarded during the quantization process. 
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Figure 7. BFR Comparison of Several Schemes 
 
 
Figure 8. Computational Time Comparison of Several Schemes 
 
Figure 8 shows the computational time comparison between the 
proposed scheme and the comparison schemes. The HRKF scheme requires a 
computational time of 16.5 seconds. Scheme [22] requires a computational 
time of 15 seconds, scheme [21] requires a computational time of 14.5 
seconds, scheme [23] requires a computational time of 13.3 seconds, and 
scheme [18] requires a computational time of 9.7 seconds. In the pre-process 
stage, schemes that use the non-hybrid method have lower computational 
time than schemes that use the hybrid method. Therefore, scheme [22] has the 
highest computational time at the pre-process stage. At the quantization stage, 
the scheme [18] requires lower computational time than other schemes 
because it uses the single-bit quantization method, while other schemes use 
multi-bit. The proposed scheme requires the highest computational time at the 
Universal Hash stage. This is influenced by the number of bits produced (BFR). 
The greater the BFR, the longer the computation time because there is a 
multiplication of bits with a 256x256 hash table. In general, the proposed 
scheme requires higher computational time than existing researchs. However, 
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the proposed scheme has better performance in terms of BFR as well as 
providing high security guarantees from passive attacker. 
 
5.2.5 Discussion 
V2V communication security requires low computing time to achieve 
driving safety. One way to reduce the computing time of a secret key formation 
scheme is to replace the Universal Hash into Generic Hash Function that has 
no collison with high randomness rate satisfying NIST Test suite requirement. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this research, we propose an effortless RSS-based secret key formation 
scheme (HRKF) to establish shared secret keys used in V2V communication. 
The purpose of the HRKF scheme is to produce keys with high BFRs and zero 
BER through non-complex schemes. To increase channel reciprocity, we use 
polynomial regression. At the quantization stage, we propose the FTQ method 
combined with a level crossing algorithm to reduce bit mismatch and minimize 
discarded bits. The experimental results show that the HRKF scheme can 
increase BFR by at least 40% and produce zero BER in all experiments. 
Furthermore, the best key obtained also fulfills the randomness requirements 
of the NIST test. The HRKF scheme can be proven to have high security from 
passive attacks because the attacker did not succeed in making one identical 
key. 
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